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Abstract
According to advocates of direct democracy, it is important to involve citizens more directly in political decision-making
processes in order to create a democratic linkage between citizens and the political system. Indeed, some studies have
demonstrated that citizens who live in direct democracies have higher levels of trust in political institutions and a higher
sense of political efficacy. However, not all empirical evidence confirms this relationship. In a recent article on Switzerland,
it was shown that, while the availability of direct democratic rights enhances trust in political institutions, using those
rights actually initiates distrust. In this paper I expand the analysis of Bauer and Fatke (2014) and test whether the dif-
ferent effects of availability of direct democratic rights and the frequency of their use also hold for broader measures of
trust in political institutions and political efficacy. I find that, even though an increased use of direct democratic measures
is associated with lower levels of confidence in authorities on the cantonal level, this relationship is no longer apparent
when applying a more comprehensive measurement of trust in political institutions.
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1. Introduction
A legitimate, stable and well-functioning polity is based
on a strong relation between citizens and the state. How-
ever, in most established democracies the mechanisms
that connect citizens with the political system have ex-
perienced fundamental changes in the last few decades
(Dalton & Welzel, 2014). Given this development, pro-
ponents of direct democracy argue that one way of sus-
taining and strengthening the linkage between citizens
and the state is to involve citizens more directly in the
political decision-making process. The theory of partici-
patory democracy provides a theoretical foundation for
this argument. Political philosophers adhering to this the-
ory assume that participation has an educative and an
integrative function that connects citizens with the com-
munity (Barber, 1984; Pateman, 1970). In recent years,
the attitudinal effect of direct democratic participation
has attracted renewed interest in the literature. Most of
this research was conducted in countries that provide cit-
izens with extensive mechanisms to engage directly in
decision-making, notably the United States and Switzer-
land. Yet, the findings of those studies seem rather in-
conclusive and—evenmore striking—the results of some
analyses are in sharp contrast with what participatory
democrats would predict.
In one of these studies on the relationship between
direct democracy and trust in cantonal authorities in
Switzerland, Bauer and Fatke (2014) found that while lev-
els of trust are higher in cantons offering extensive di-
rect democratic rights, they are lower in cantons where
citizens made frequent use of these rights. It was con-
cluded that a more frequent use of direct democratic
rights results in stronger feelings of distrust. Dyck (2009)
obtained similar results in the American context, as he
shows that ballot initiatives in theUnited States decrease
trust in state governments. These studies suggest that,
while the availability of direct democratic procedures
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might have the effect that is envisioned in the literature,
the fact that citizens actually use those opportunities
might be an indication of distrust rather than trust. As
a result, they conclude that the use of direct democratic
procedures might initiate political distrust.
However, when looking closely at the indicators used
to measure political trust in these two studies, it is clear
that Bauer and Fatke (2014) as well as Dyck (2009) relied
on a rather narrow measurement only capturing trust in
authorities on the canton or the state level. While this
negative relationship between such specific measures of
trust and the use of direct democratic procedures could
be conceivable, it remains to be investigatedwhether we
also find the same effect when using a more encompass-
ing measure of trust in political institutions. A broader
operationalization of trust in political institutions seems
essential because it can represent “a comprehensive as-
sessment of the political culture that is prevailing in a po-
litical system” (Hooghe, 2011, p. 270). In line with David
Easton (1965, 1975), I consider trust in political institu-
tions as an expression of support for the political system
and not just the result of satisfaction with performance
(Chanley, Rudolph, & Rahn, 2000; Marien & Hooghe,
2011; Miller & Listhaug, 1990). Consequently, trust in po-
litical institutions represents a form of legitimacy (Het-
herington, 1998; Zmerli & Hooghe, 2011). From a nor-
mative point of view, a negative effect of direct democ-
racy on trust in political institutions would be alarming
as it would endanger the functioning and the stability
of the democratic system. I therefore rely on trust in
political institutions in its broad definition and further-
more expand the analysis by including a second mea-
sure directly related to the classical conceptualization of
a democratic civic culture, namely: external political effi-
cacy, or in other words: the belief that governmental in-
stitutions and public officials are responsive to the inter-
ests, needs and demands of citizens. Political efficacy is
evidently a very distinct concept from political trust, but
the entire research tradition on the civic culture stresses
that it is crucial for citizens to see themselves as active
participants in the political process. Both concepts there-
fore represent important political attitudes linking citi-
zens and the state. Already in Almond and Verba’s The
Civic Culture (1963) both attitudes were considered to
be an essential element of a democratic civic culture.
To investigate the relationship between having and
using direct democratic rights and support for the po-
litical system, I rely on the models of Bauer and Fatke
(2014) and extend their analysis. I do so by including
other, more comprehensive attitudinal measurements
than in the original study, namely trust in political insti-
tutions and external political efficacy. It is assumed that
these attitudes are developed during childhood and that
they are relatively independent of outputs in the short
run and hence comparatively stable over time (Easton,
1975; Iyengar, 1980). To measure trust in political institu-
tions and external political efficacy, I draw on two differ-
ent datasets from Switzerland: the Swiss Electoral Stud-
ies “Selects” and the Swiss Household Panel (SHP). The
Selects survey 2007 is a post-election survey based on a
national representative sample and the SHP is a rich, rep-
resentative, household-based study aimed to observe so-
cial change in Switzerland since 1999. I start with a repli-
cation of the results of Bauer and Fatke (2014) with the
use of datasets from 2007. As is well-known, Switzerland
has a unique history of a rather frequent use of direct
democracy, and therefore the country can serve as an
ideal test case.
2. Political Participation and “Thick” Democracy
In her seminal work Participation and Democratic The-
ory, Pateman (1970) describes participatory democracy
which underlines the educative value of political partic-
ipation as opposed to liberal democracy which mainly
highlights the instrumental value of political participa-
tion for the participants. Pateman summarizes three
functions of political participation. First, political partic-
ipation has an educative function, second, it has an in-
tegrative function and third, it facilitates the acceptance
of decisions. For participatory democrats, the first and
most important function is the educative function of po-
litical participation. Citizens who participate in political
decision-making are assumed to learn to take other inter-
ests than their own into accountwhen engaging in partic-
ipatory processes. Moreover, they are expected to learn
that public and private interests are linked and they are
stimulated to deliberate with each other. It is through
participation that individuals are expected to acquire the
qualities needed for the political system to work. Conse-
quently, it is through “participation in common seeing
and common work” that members of a “strong” demo-
cratic community are transformed into citizens (Barber,
1984, p. 232). While Rousseau described the educative
effects of political participation in the context of the city-
state, John Stuart Mill described these in the scope of a
modern political system, thus extending Rousseau’s de-
scription of the educative function of participation. As
Pateman (1970) points out, according to Mill, the local
level of government plays a crucial role in “educating”
the individual. In order to participate effectively in gov-
ernment, citizens need to develop the necessary quali-
ties at the local level. Mill writes “a political act, to be
done only once in a few years, and for which nothing in
the daily habits of the citizen has prepared him, leaves his
intellect and his moral dispositions very much as it found
them” (Mill, as cited in Pateman, 1970, p. 30). Follow-
ing this theory, citizens need a context in which they can
practice their engagement in the decision-making pro-
cess. While the local level of politics seems like a suitable
context forMill, Cole and Pateman stress the importance
of participatory structures in the workplace or even in
all “lower level authority structures” (Pateman, 1970,
p. 35) as environments where citizens can experience
andpractice participating in decision-making procedures.
According to this theory, we can expect, that individuals
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who frequently engage in decision-making procedures,
develop more positive, democratic characteristics, such
as community-mindedness, political efficacy and satisfac-
tion with political institutions and authorities, and are
generallymore supportive of the democratic system (Bar-
ber, 1984; Finkel, 1987; Pateman, 1970). What remains
unclear, however, is whether this theory helps us to
understand the potential consequences of direct demo-
cratic decision-making. Can participation in direct demo-
cratic procedures fulfil the same role as participation at
the local level or in the workplace is expected to do?
Bowler and Donovan (2002) discuss this question ex-
plicitly. They argue that, although direct democratic pro-
cedures may not have the same educative value as par-
ticipation in the workplace, compared to the election
of representatives, direct democratic procedures should
have a greater effect on political efficacy. This reasoning
is built on the argument that, in comparison to the stan-
dard electoral context of representative democracy, cit-
izens in democracies with direct democratic procedures
must decide more often on collective issues and public
policies. Through direct democratic decision-making cit-
izens get an “occasional voice in government” and feel
that the government is listening to them “or has to lis-
ten to them at some point” (Bowler & Donovan, 2002,
p. 376). But citizens might not only feel that government
listens to them, theymight also feel that they are trusted,
which is a crucial point according to Frey (1997, p. 1046),
as their self-esteem is enhanced and their intrinsic moti-
vation is “crowded in”. Finally, when comparing citizens
in representative democracies with citizens in systems
with direct democratic procedures, the lattermight expe-
rience more positive political attitudes and democratic
orientations, because they are more satisfied with the
democratic procedures (Hibbing & Theiss-Morse, 2001;
Persson, Esaiasson, & Gilljam, 2013; Smith & Tolbert,
2004). In accordance with these arguments, it can be as-
sumed that the central claim of participatory democracy
applies to systems with extensive direct democratic pro-
cedures and that citizens who live in these systems are
characterized by more positive attitudes towards the po-
litical system.
Indeed, some studies find evidence for the “ed-
ucative benefit” of direct democratic decision-making.
These analyses suggest that citizens who live in direct
democracies are characterized by higher levels of exter-
nal efficacy, i.e. they believe more strongly that the gov-
ernment is responsive to their demands (Bowler & Dono-
van, 2002; Hero & Tolbert, 2004; Mendelsohn & Cut-
ler, 2000; Smith & Tolbert, 2004), their levels of political
knowledge and interest are higher (Mendelsohn & Cut-
ler, 2000; Smith, 2002) and they are more engaged in
civic groups and associations (Smith & Tolbert, 2004; Tol-
bert, McNeal, & Smith, 2003).
However, not all empirical evidence confirms this di-
rect positive relationship between direct democratic pro-
cedures and political attitudes and behavior. Whereas
Gilens, Glaser and Mendelberg (2001) cannot find a di-
rect effect of propositions on political attitudes, they
show that it is the salience of the propositions that seems
to affect citizens’ perception of having a say in political is-
sues. The absence of a direct effect betweendirect demo-
cratic procedures and both internal and external efficacy
is also ascertained by Schlozman and Yohai (2008) and by
Dyck and Lascher (2009) who show that the effect of di-
rect democracy on internal political efficacy depends on
citizens’ political knowledge.
A striking contrast between studies that find a posi-
tive effect of direct democracy on political attitudes and
those that find no effect, is that scholars who find no ef-
fect distinguished between the institutional availability
of direct democratic rights and the frequency of their ac-
tual use. This important distinction is not always clearly
made in the literature and might explain the mixed evi-
dence. It thus remains an open questionwhether citizens
become more trusting and efficacious by actually mak-
ing use of direct democratic procedures or whether it is
sufficient that these opportunities are available to them,
regardless of whether they actually use these additional
possibilities to voice their opinion.
3. The Availability and Use of Direct Democratic
Procedures
Several studies show that there is a difference between
the effect of the availability of direct democratic proce-
dures on political attitudes and the effect of actually us-
ing those procedures. Dyck (2009) finds that the availabil-
ity of direct democratic initiatives in the United States
does not affect trust in the state government, but that
their actual use affects trust negatively. This negative ef-
fect is confirmed in the study on trust in cantonal au-
thorities in Switzerland (Bauer & Fatke, 2014), where
the authors also find a positive effect on trust when di-
rect democratic procedures are available. Therefore, the
question arises whether we should expect the availabil-
ity and the use of direct democratic procedures to have
different effects on political attitudes.
From the perspective of the theory of participatory
democracy the results of Bauer and Fatke (2014) and
Dyck (2009) are highly relevant as they seem to run
counter to expectations. For adherents of this theory,
using direct democratic procedures should lead to pos-
itive effects, as it is the act of participation itself that is
expected to build and nurture democratic orientations
and political attitudes. In order to obtain this psychologi-
cal effect, the classical writers advocate full participation.
However, Pateman (1970, p. 73) remarks that in this con-
text a modification of the theory is required, because
empirical evidence shows that “even the mere feeling
that participation is possible, even situations of pseudo-
participation have beneficial effects on confidence, job
satisfaction, etc.”. One might thus argue that citizens
might be more supportive if they have the feeling that
they are able to participate, independent of whether
they actually do or not. The argument that government is
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responsive and considers citizens as trustworthy should
be valid for citizens independent of their actual en-
gagement. Moreover, citizens might be more satisfied
with the decision-making process in a system where di-
rect democratic procedures are available, regardless of
whether they participate or not. In conclusion, the theory
of participatory democracy does not seem to provide a
theoretical foundation to explain the different effects on
political attitudes between the availability and the use of
direct democratic procedures. The first hypothesis thus
reads as follows:
H1. Citizens who live in systems that provide exten-
sive direct democratic decision-making processes are
characterized by higher levels of trust in political insti-
tutions and higher external political efficacy.
Consequently, it remains questionable how we can then
explain the negative relation between the use of direct
democratic rights and trust in canton and state level
authorities, found by Bauer and Fatke (2014) and Dyck
(2009). The authors give a number of reasons why this
negative relationshipwas to be expected. If we start from
the premise of liberal democracy instead of participatory
democracy, and assume that participation mainly serves
to protect citizens’ individual interests, direct democracy
can be used as a sanctioning instrument. In agreement
with this assumption citizens, in states or cantons fre-
quently employing this instrument, might get the impres-
sion that sanctioning is a necessity and that elected rep-
resentatives are not to be trusted (Bauer & Fatke, 2014).
This would be in line with the argument made by Rosan-
vallon (2008) that critical citizens should exert a rather
strict oversight on the behaviour of political decision-
making elites. Dyck (2009) argues that being constantly
questioned and pressured to give their opinion, initia-
tives might undermine the authority of elected officials,
which might again lead to increasing distrust among the
population. At the same time, Bauer and Fatke (2014,
p. 54) point out that representatives who are constantly
controlled “might no longer feel the same obligation
to honour the trust of being voted into office”, which
might encourage them to “follow their own agenda” or
to tweak contested legislation in the phase of implemen-
tation where citizens have less influence. Such behaviour
might by implication enhance citizens’ distrust and di-
minish their sense of political efficacy. While this reason-
ing suggests that direct democratic participation affects
citizen’s attitudes towards the political system, the argu-
ment that direct democratic processes are used as a sanc-
tioning mechanism rests on the reverse causal mecha-
nism, namely that participating citizens are already dis-
satisfied with the performance of political institutions.
Using an instrumental variable regression, Bauer and
Fatke (2014) find evidence for the former causal mecha-
nism that participation affects trust. MacKenzie andWar-
ren (2012) however, argue that participation might stem
from a lack of trust. Following this reasoning, citizens
might choose to use their direct democratic rights af-
ter evaluating how trustworthy their cantonal or state
authorities are and how responsive they are to their
interest. This reasoning would be in line with Gamson
(1968, pp. 46–47) who stated that “high trust in au-
thorities implies some lack of necessity for influencing
them”. Consequently, one would expect that citizens will
only use direct democracy if there is a necessity to influ-
ence policy-makers.
While both mechanisms seem plausible for explain-
ing a negative relationship between trust in cantonal or
state authorities—the dependent variables in the stud-
ies of Bauer and Fatke (2014) and Dyck (2009)—and en-
gagement in direct democratic decision-making proce-
dures, it remains unclear whether these explanations
can also be applied to a broader notion of trust in po-
litical institutions and to external political efficacy. The
argument that frequent use of direct democratic proce-
dures reduces political trust, as those procedures are
used as sanctioning mechanisms seems to hold mainly
in cases where citizens are dissatisfied with the output
and the performance of political authorities and institu-
tions. The reasoning seems to hold mainly for trust in
specific institutions and authorities and is therefore ex-
pected to depend mainly on the perceived output and
performance of those institutions. In fact, the dependent
variables in the above mentioned studies are, as Dyck
(2009, p. 550) points out himself, “strongly tied to incum-
bent evaluations”.
However, regarding the broader measurement of
trust in political institutions, the reasoning seems less
straightforward. Trust in political institutions is an as-
sessment of general political structures and procedures,
and it tends to be more durable and independent of
institutions’ performances and output in the short run.
Only after a continuous experience of discontent over
a long period of time, general feelings of trust in po-
litical institutions might gradually erode (Easton, 1975;
Hooghe, 2011). Therefore, I argue that while there are
good reasons to assume that using direct democratic
procedures is related to evaluations of democratic out-
put and performance of specific political institutions, it
is far less clear why using direct democratic procedures
should lead to an erosion of trust in political institutions
more generally.
Also regarding external political efficacy, a negative
relationship due to the use of direct democratic rights
can hardly be expected based on the theory. In fact, Hero
and Tolbert (2004) argue that, in states with frequent
exposure to direct democracy, citizens should be more
inclined to perceive government as more responsive.
A negative effect on external efficacy would rather be
expected as a result of non-participation (Finkel, 1987).
I therefore argue that the negative effect of using direct
democratic procedures found in the study of trust in can-
tonal and state authorities does not hold in a study of
trust in political institutions and external political effi-
cacy. This leads us to the second hypothesis:
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H2. The negative effect of using direct democratic pro-
cedures does not hold if we study trust in political in-
stitutions and external political efficacy.
I test those hypotheses using Swiss population data,
but before presenting the results, I will introduce the
datasets, measures and method.
4. Data, Measures and Method
First of all the results of Bauer and Fatke (2014) are repli-
cated. In a second step, their models are extended to the
study of trust in political institutions and political efficacy.
For this purpose, I will use the same data as they did,
namely the 2007 dataset from the Swiss Electoral Studies
“Selects” that contains not only trust in cantonal authori-
ties but also other items allowing us to create a compre-
hensive measure of trust in political institutions. As the
Selects dataset does not contain any measure of politi-
cal efficacy, I use a different dataset for the analysis of
political efficacy, namely the 2007 wave of the SHP. Both
datasets are based on random probability samples from
the Swiss population and for both studies data were col-
lected in a similar period of time. This allows us to include
the same variables of interest, i.e. the availability and use
of direct democratic instruments and to keep the analy-
sis as comparable as possible to the original analysis of
Bauer and Fatke (2014). However, as the SHP only con-
tains one question on the perception of system respon-
siveness, the analysis has to be restricted to external po-
litical efficacy.
4.1. Dependent Variables
In comparison to the study of Bauer and Fatke (2014), I
expand the analysis to support for the system as a whole
and therefore I want to capture the level of trust in polit-
ical institutions more broadly. As Easton explains (1975,
p. 444) diffuse support “refers to evaluations of what an
object is or represents—to the general meaning it has
for a person—not of what it does”. Therefore, if we start
from Easton’s concept of diffuse support, we need indi-
cators for support that are independent of outputs and
performances in the short run.Marien (2011) argues that
the question about how much people trust their coun-
try’s parliament, government, political parties, legal sys-
tem, the police, etc. does tap into a more encompass-
ing form of political trust—although we cannot rule out
that respondents think about how these institutions are
functioning. According to Hooghe (2011, p. 270), the la-
tent concept that is built on these items “can be con-
ceptualized as a comprehensive evaluation of the polit-
ical culture that is prevailing within a political system….”.
Hence, instead of focusing on for example satisfaction
with the functioning of an institution or authority, I de-
cided to measure trust in political institutions based on
the following items included in the Selects 2007 survey:
trust in the federal council, trust in parliament, trust in
national political parties, trust in local authorities, trust
in justice/courts, trust in the police and trust in cantonal
authorities (the item that was used in the first step of the
analysis). Assuming that this latent concept of trust in po-
litical institutions reflects the trustworthiness of the po-
litical system as a whole, it is expected that the different
items on trust in actors and institutions load on one sin-
gle latent variable. For each item respondents indicated
their level of trust on an 11-point scale (0 = “no trust”;
10 = “full trust”). Based on these items, I conducted a
factor analysis and found, in line with previous research,
that these items load one single factor (Marien, 2011;
Zmerli, Newton, &Montero, 2007) with an Eigenvalue of
3.214 and 46 per cent explained variance (Table 1). This
measurement of trust in political institutions is thus one-
dimensional and coherent. This finding confirms the ar-
gumentation of Hooghe (2011) that citizens do not distin-
guish between the functioning of various political institu-
tions, and therefore this factor was used as measure of
trust in political institutions.
Table 1. Factor analysis of trust in political institutions.
Source: (Selects, 2007).
Item Factor loading
Trust in the federal council 0.720
Trust in parliament 0.744
Trust in national political parties 0.644
Trust in local authorities 0.624
Trust in cantonal authorities 0.749
Trust in justice/courts 0.646
Trust in the police 0.600
% explained variance 0.459
Eigenvalue 3.214
Notes: Estimates are factor loadings from a principal factor
analysis.
espacoFor themeasurement of external political efficacy I relied
on the question “Howmuch influence do you think some-
one like you can have on government policy?” in the SHP
2007 personal questionnaire, respondents could answer
on an 11-point scale with 0 indicating “no influence” and
10 indicating “a very strong influence”. Following Niemi,
Craig and Mattei (1991) this item primarily taps respon-
dents’ beliefs about the responsiveness of governmental
authorities and institutions to citizen demands, i.e. their
sense of external political efficacy.
4.2. Independent Variables
As I aim to build on the analysis of Bauer and Fatke
(2014) I use the samemeasures as they did for the inde-
pendent variables of interest, namely the availability of
direct democratic rights and the use of those rights. For
the availability of those rights, I thus rely on the same
index that was created by Fischer (2009). This index rep-
resents a summary index of four sub-indices capturing
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the strength of four direct democratic institutions in
2003: the initiatives for constitutional and statutory
changes, the fiscal referendum on expenditure projects
and the referendum for laws. Each sub-index ranges from
one to six and reflects the evaluation of the requirements
for those four institutions, more specifically the signa-
ture requirements needed for optional referendums and
the fiscal thresholds for fiscal referendums. Therefore,
each sub-index measures the availability and the im-
posed hurdles for each of the four direct democratic pro-
cedures in the Swiss cantons.
Regarding the actual use of these direct democratic
instruments, I use the average number of cantonal initia-
tives and optional referendums per year between 2002
and 2006 generated by Bauer and Fatke (2014) based on
data from the year book Année Politique Suisse, which is
generally considered as a comprehensive account of po-
litical events in Switzerland.
4.3. Control Variables
I furthermore control for variables that could affect trust
in political institutions and political efficacy on the indi-
vidual as well as on the cantonal level. Again, since I am
interested in an analysis that is as close as possible to the
one presented by Bauer and Fatke (2014), I also include
exactly the same control variables. For the analysis of
trust in political institutions this is: gender, age, the level
of education, and the perception of the economic devel-
opment. Also, I include a dummy variable for Catholic de-
nomination and unemployment status. Thanks to their
detailed documentation of data sources, I could also in-
clude the same canton-level control variables, namely
the financial state of cantons in 2006 and the primary na-
tional income per capita in 2005.
For the analysis of external political efficacy, I include
the same control variables, expect for religious denom-
ination and the perception of economic development.
I excluded religious denomination, because in the lit-
erature I found no reason to assume that religious de-
nomination should affect the sense of external efficacy.
Economic evaluations, on the other hand, are expected
to affect general political attitudes (Bowler & Donovan,
2002). However, the item used in the Selects survey is
not included in the SHP, so instead I included a variable
that measures the respondent’s evaluation of his or her
standard of living in the past year. Respondents could
answer on a scale from 0 (“greatly worsened”) to 10
(“greatly improved”).
In both the analysis of trust in political institutions
and the analysis of external political efficacy, I dropped
the canton Nidwalden, because the Selects survey 2007
does not contain data for this canton. This resulted in
3,858 respondents for the analysis of trust in political in-
stitutions and 4,094 respondents for the analysis of exter-
nal political efficacy. In both analyses these respondents
are nested in cantons, which is why I rely on varying in-
tercept models.
5. Results
In the first step, I replicate the analysis of trust in can-
tonal authorities of Bauer and Fatke (2014) (their Table 2).
Not surprisingly, since using the samedata, I find virtually
the same results (see Annex, Table A). As the final model,
which contains all the control variables and both vari-
ables of interest shows, the availability of direct demo-
cratic rights positively affects trust in cantonal authori-
ties while their actual use has a significant, negative ef-
fect. So this first step clearly confirms the conclusion of
Bauer and Fatke.
In the second step, I replicate the exact same analy-
sis but this time I replace the dependent variable with
the variable that captures trust in political institutions
(Table 2). The first remarkable observation is that there is
considerably less variance in trust in political institutions
on the second level compared to the variance in trust
in cantonal authorities. Our replication of the intercept-
only model of trust in cantonal authorities reveals that
about 6 per cent of the entire variance is found on the
second level. For the intercept-only model of trust in
political institutions, this is only 2.3 per cent. This con-
firms the assumption that trust in cantonal authorities
captures evaluations of the performance of specific insti-
tutions apparently which vary quite substantially across
the 25 cantons. The broader attitude of trust in politi-
cal institutions, on the other hand, captures an attitude
that varies primarily between individuals independent of
where they live. Therefore, when attempting to explain
the variance in trust in political institutions,wehave to fo-
cus mainly on individual characteristics. This observation
already challenges the first hypothesis claiming that citi-
zens living in cantons that provide more extensive direct
democratic decision-making processes are characterized
by higher levels of trust in political institutions and ex-
ternal efficacy. The effects of those individual-level vari-
ables, however, are similar compared to the effects in the
analysis of trust in cantonal authorities. While sex does
not seem tomatter, trust in political institutions seems to
rise with age and the level of education. Ceteris paribus,
Catholics seem to have higher levels of trust in political
institutions, whereas unemployment is associated with
lower levels of trust in political institutions. Also, citizens
who believe that the state of the economy has worsened
are significantly less trustful. Looking at the second-level
control variables shows that a canton’s financial state
and national income do not affect individuals’ level of
trust in political institutions.
Finally, I turn to our variables of interest. The first
model reveals that the availability of direct democratic
rights does affect levels of trust in political institutions
positively, which seems in line with what the theory of
participatory democracy would predict. Similarly to the
analysis of trust in cantonal authorities, but in sharp con-
trast to what we expected, we find that in the second
model, the use of democratic instruments has a signifi-
cant, negative effect on trust in political institutions.
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Table 2. Random-intercept models of direct democracy and trust in political institutions. Source: Selects (2007).
Trust in political institutions
I II III
Age −0.002** (0.001) −0.002** (0.001) −0.002** (0.001)
Sex −0.036 (0.030) −0.036 (0.030) −0.036 (0.030)
Education −0.022*** (0.004) −0.023*** (0.004) −0.022*** (0.004)
Catholic (Dummy) −0.122*** (0.032) −0.123*** (0.032) −0.121*** (0.032)
Economy worse (Dummy) −0.281*** (0.052) −0.284*** (0.052) −0.281*** (0.052)
Unemployed (Dummy) −0.233* (0.126) −0.235* (0.126) −0.233* (0.126)
Availability of direct −0.051** (0.026) −0.036 (0.031)
democratic rights
Actual use of direct −0.047* (0.025) −0.027 (0.031)
democratic instruments
Financial state −0.001 (0.026) −0.000 (0.026) −0.002 (0.026)
National income −0.144 (0.516) −0.818 (0.555) −0.463 (0.627)
Constant −0.568** (0.228) −0.595** (0.232) −0.604*** (0.228)
Observations 3,858 3,858 3,858
Number of groups 25 25 25
−2 * loglikelihood 10,165 10,166 10,164
ICC in % 0.016 0.016 0.015
Notes: The dependent variable is trust in political institutions. Standard errors in parentheses. Sign.:*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
Yet, both effects disappear when we include them to-
gether in one model (Model III) and at this point, the con-
clusions differ strongly from the conclusions resulting from
the analysis of trust in cantonal authorities. Neither the
availability nor the use of direct democratic procedures
seems to affect trust in political institutions. On the one
hand, this result contradicts the first hypothesis. On the
other hand, the negative effect of using direct democratic
instruments disappears and this supports the second hy-
pothesis. So, while using direct democratic measures ap-
parently cannot enhance trust in political institutions, the
good news for advocates of participatory democracy is
that at least it does not seem to reduce it either.
In a final step we turn to the analysis of external
political efficacy (Table 3). This variable varies even less
across cantons than trust in political institutions. Only
about 2 per cent of the variance in the intercept-only
model is detected at the second level. Concerning the
individual level variables, we find different effects than
for trust in political institutions. We find that while older
people seem to have more trust in political institutions
than younger citizens, the sense of external political effi-
cacy seems to diminish with age. Moreover, citizens with
a higher level of education appear to have more trust in
political institutions and also more external political effi-
cacy, the latter being also the case for citizens who feel
that their standard of living has improved.
Turning to the variables of interest, we find that the
availability of direct democratic rights has a positive ef-
fect on external efficacy (Model I) and this effect also
holds when we include the use of direct democratic in-
struments into the same model (Model III). Using direct
democratic instruments, however, does not affect exter-
nal efficacy, neither in the second nor in the final model
(Model III). Apparently, citizens have a stronger feeling
that government is responsive to their demands and in-
terests in cantons where direct democratic instruments
are extensively available and hurdles to use them are low.
And this effect remains observable independent of how
often those instruments are actually used.
6. Discussion and Conclusion
Summarizing the results, we can state that there is only
limited evidence for the first hypothesis which claimed
that the availability and the use of direct democratic pro-
cedures has a positive effect on political attitudes that
tap support for the political system. While we could not
find any effect for the analysis of trust in political insti-
tutions, levels of external efficacy are significantly higher
in cantons which are characterized by an extensive avail-
ability of direct democratic procedures. However, it has
to be remarked that there is generally a lot less variance
of both trust in political institutions as well as in exter-
nal political efficacy across the 25 cantons compared to
the variance that is found for trust in cantonal authorities.
So while evaluations of cantonal authorities depend to a
substantial degree on the cantonwhere respondents live,
levels of general trust in political institutions and feelings
of external efficacy are hardly dependent on this admin-
istrative division. I interpret this finding as evidence for
the claim that trust in authorities captures evaluations of
performances of specific institutions rather than trust in
political institutions as such.
Concerning the second hypothesis, we did find evi-
dence to support the claim that while there are good rea-
sons to argue that using direct democratic instruments
affects trust in cantonal authorities negatively, such a
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Table 3. Random-intercept models of direct democracy and external political efficacy. Source: SHP.
External Political Efficacy
I II III
Age −0.015*** (0.003) −0.015*** (0.003) −0.015*** (0.003)
Sex −0.053 (0.086) −0.052 (0.086) −0.053 (0.086)
Education −0.095*** (0.015) −0.094*** (0.015) −0.095*** (0.015)
Living standard improved −0.158*** (0.035) −0.158*** (0.035) −0.157*** (0.035)
Unemployed (Dummy) −0.434 (0.370) −0.437 (0.370) −0.436 (0.370)
Availability of direct −0.192*** (0.054) −0.181*** (0.061)
democratic rights
Actual use of direct −0.113 (0.070) −0.025 (0.068)
democratic instruments
Financial state −0.079 (0.065) −0.085 (0.076) −0.074 (0.065)
National income −0.974 (1.187) −3.323** (1.506) −1.358 (1.523)
Constant −1.724*** (0.592) −1.572** (0.690) −1.666*** (0.606)
Observations 4,094 4,094
Number of groups 25 25
−2 * loglikelihood 19,331 19,339
ICC in % 0.004 0.009
Notes: The dependent variable is external political efficacy. Standard errors in parentheses. Sign.:*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
negative effect is unexpected in the more general study
of trust in political institutions. In fact, using direct demo-
cratic instruments seems to affect neither trust in polit-
ical institutions nor external political efficacy. If direct
democratic instruments are used as sanctioning mech-
anism for negatively perceived performances and out-
puts of authorities, this can explain the negative effect
on evaluations of cantonal authorities and institutions.
However, there is little reason to assume that broader
attitudes of support for the system are also affected.
I believe that this study can contribute to a better un-
derstanding of themixed evidence that was found in pre-
vious studies concerning the link between direct demo-
cratic procedures and political attitudes. In this regard,
two aspects should be considered. First, in some stud-
ies a difference is made between availability of direct
democratic rights and the use of direct democratic in-
struments and because results differ quite substantively
this study confirms the importance of this distinction.
Second, different measures of trust in political institu-
tions have been employed in those studies and different
theories have been applied to explain the results. This
study underlines the importance of clearly distinguishing
between these different measures. Participatory democ-
racy can primarily serve to understand the long-term ef-
fects of extensive participation in different areas of life
on support for the political system. Liberal democracy,
on the other hand, which stresses the protective func-
tion of participation, might help to explain evaluations
of political outputs and performances of specific author-
ities and institutions.
But what do these results tell us about the applica-
bility of the theory of participatory democracy to direct
democratic procedures? The findings of Bauer and Fatke
(2014) and Dyck (2009) seem inexplicable from the per-
spective of participatory democracy, as they suggest that
using more opportunities for direct participation “initi-
ates distrust”, which our analysis can qualify to some de-
gree. While an increase in the use of direct democratic
measuresmight diminish trust in authorities on the state
or canton level, it does not affect the general feeling of
support for the political system. So in the end it is not
too bad of a result for adherents of this theory. However,
these results can be interpreted in two ways.
On the one hand, the results show that providing cit-
izens with more direct democratic instruments appears
to affect their trust in cantonal authorities positively as
well as their sense of external efficacy—and this indepen-
dent of howmuch those instruments are used. Apparently,
having the option of interfering is already sufficient to
strengthen citizens’ trust in cantonal authorities and their
perceived government responsiveness. A possible reason
could be that citizens are satisfiedwith the democratic pro-
cess itself, regardless of whether they use it or not. This
interpretation would be in line with the claim of Dalton
and Welzel (2014) that new generations of “assertive citi-
zens” are characterized by a strong appreciation of input-
oriented notions of democracy. Hence, if direct participa-
tion can lead to more critical citizens, who are supportive
of the system in general, some scholars might argue that
this represents a desirable situation from a democratic
perspective (Dalton &Welzel, 2014; Rosanvallon, 2008).
On the other hand, support for the first hypothe-
sis that links direct democratic participation with polit-
ical support remains limited, which might call the gen-
eral applicability of the theory of participatory democ-
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racy for direct democratic systems into question. As we
have seen for both trust in political institutions as well
as for political efficacy, by far most of the variance is
found on the individual level and can therefore not be ex-
plained by the variance in the extent of direct democratic
decision-making. One argument could be that, compared
to other countries, Swiss cantons all provide relatively ex-
tensive opportunities of participation in decision-making
processes and that the variance within Switzerland is
therefore too limited. Another, even more fundamental
reason could be that participatory democrats seem to en-
vision an entirely different society with multiple partici-
pation possibilities in the workplace, during leisure activ-
ities and at all levels of the political system.Moreover, as
Schlozman and Yohai (2008, p. 472) point out, these the-
orists stress the importance of deliberation and the ben-
efits of deliberation cannot arise in plebiscites “where
voters do not deliberate or where their interests clash”.
So scholars should be careful when applying the theory
of participatory democracy to direct democratic systems
and not blindly base their assumptions on a theory that
envisions an entire reconfiguration of todays’ political,
economic and societal institutions.
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Annex
Table A. Random-intercept models of direct democracy and external trust in cantonal authorities.
Trust in cantonal authorities
I II III IV V VI
Age −(0.007*** −(0.007*** −(0.007*** −(0.007*** −(0.007*** −(0.007***
−(0.002) −(0.002) −(0.002) −(0.002) −(0.002) −(0.002)
Sex −(0.053 −(0.055 −(0.053 −(0.055 −(0.053 −(0.054
−(0.061) −(0.061) −(0.061) −(0.061) −(0.061) −(0.061)
Education −(0.027*** −(0.028*** −(0.028*** −(0.028*** −(0.028*** −(0.028***
−(0.009) −(0.009) −(0.009) −(0.009) −(0.009) −(0.009)
Catholic (Dummy) −(0.196*** −(0.197*** −(0.188*** −(0.200*** −(0.199*** −(0.198***
−(0.067) −(0.066) −(0.067) −(0.067) −(0.067) −(0.067)
Economy worse (Dummy) (−0.456*** (−0.445*** (−0.457*** (−0.444*** (−0.452*** (−0.445***
−(0.103) −(0.103) −(0.103) −(0.103) −(0.103) −(0.103)
Unemployed (Dummy) (−0.350 (−0.344 (−0.349 (−0.344 (−0.350 (−0.345
−(0.263) −(0.263) −(0.263) −(0.263) −(0.263) −(0.263)
Availability of direct −(0.282*** −(0.275*** −(0.198**
democratic rights −(0.067) −(0.070) −(0.080)
Actual use of direct (−0.151** (−0.243*** (−0.134*
democratic instruments −(0.075) −(0.073) −(0.079)
Financial state −(0.015 −(0.021 −(0.012
−(0.072) −(0.076) −(0.068)
National income −(0.356 −(3.914** −(1.966
−(1.383) −(1.567) −(1.618)
Constant −(6.013*** −(4.846*** −(6.221*** −(4.644*** −(4.519*** −(4.451***
−(0.187) −(0.329) −(0.210) −(0.605) −(0.649) −(0.587)
Observations 4,225 4,225 4,225 4,225 4,225 4,225
Number of groups 25 25 25 25 25 25
−2 * loglikelihood 17,646 17,634 17,642 17,633 17,636 17,630
ICC in % 0.055 0.030 0.046 0.029 0.033 0.026
Note: The dependent variable is trust in cantonal authorities. Standard errors in parentheses. Sign.:*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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